This paper examines the ability of nancial advice provided by sellers of nancial services to substitute for nancial literacy of customers. I set up a simple theoretical model in which an informed nancial advisor communicates with a less informed customer of nancial services. Given the existence of a conict of interest from the advisor's perspective, the model predicts that only well nancially sophisticated customers receive relevant information from the advisor. This fact tends to prevent less nancially sophisticated customers from asking advice although they are the most in need of nancial guidance. Overall, the model predicts a positive relationship between nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice. I then use a representative sample of French households (PATER 2011) to test the predictions of the model. I nd that nancial literacy is strongly associated to the probability to ask a nancial advisor. Decomposing the measure of nancial literacy, I show that the relationship is weakly monotonic which provides support to the fact that nancial advice cannot substitute for nancial literacy. This result is robust to alternative specications and instrumental variables regressions.
Introduction
The issue of substituability between nancial literacy and nancial advice is gaining audience, as nancial products become more complex and households exhibit low nancial sophistication. Financial illiteracy has been shown to have important consequences for household's nancial well-being. Financially unsophisticated households tend to save less than others, especially for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007a; Banks et al. 2011; Arrondel et al. 2013) . They are also less prone to hold stocks (van Rooij et al. 2011; Arrondel et al. 2015) , to accumulate wealth (van Rooij et al. 2012 ) and tend to get over-indebted more often than other households (Lusardi and Tufano 2009; Gerardi et al. 2010) . But nancial illiteracy would not be an issue if households could seek for guidance from qualied sources such as bankers or independent nancial advisors that can mitigate nancial mistakes (Bluethgen et al. 2008 ).
In France, most households lack command of basic economic and nancial concepts (Arrondel et al. 2013) and tend to rely on nancial advisors when they decide to make a nancial decisions. About 49% of French households (PATER Survey 2011) declare to seek nancial information mainly from their bank or from independent nancial advisors (conseillers en investissements nanciers). The compensation arrangements of these professionals dier but remain interested and product-biased in both cases. While bankers tend to charge a onetime commission on selling a specic product, independent nancial advisors act as intermediaries and receive trailing commissions 1 . These compensation schemes can lead advisors to pursue goals that are not necessarily in the interest of customers and this way alter the capacity of nancial advice to provide a consistent substitute for nancial literacy. This paper examines this issue from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. I A substantial body of the literature has questioned the capacity of experts (agents) to provide relevant advice to investors (principals) which decisions inuence both outcomes in a context of hidden information and incomplete contracts. Several papers focus on the supply side of the nancial advice industry either looking at the market structure or the internal organization of rm's sales process. Bolton et al. (2007) consider a model of competition between two nancial intermediaries oering advice to uninformed investors. They show that competition can lead intermediaries to provide relevant information to customers even in the presence of small reputational costs. Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) look at the compensation scheme set up by a rm to incentivize its employees to nd new customers. They show that the rm tolerance to misselling depends on its own sales process, agent's costs of prospecting new clients and disclosure of commission structure which altogether make 1 For more information on the legal dispositions regarding the compensation schemes of independent nancial advisors in France see: AMF -Reglement general, art. 325-6. it dicult for policy makers to have a uniform set of regulation.
Other papers like this one rather adopt a demand-side approach. The core question addressed is whether investor's information or nancial literacy acts as a substitute or a complement to resorting to nancial advisors. No unique answer has been brought in the literature and the main reason for this is because the papers consider dierent denitions of what relying on a nancial advisor means: delegating nancial decisions, consulting/asking for advice or following recommendations. The paper by Aghion and Tirole (1997) provides a rst insight though it cannot be presented as a model of advice because no communication is involved. The principal trades o delegating her decision to the agent and deciding alone. In the former case, the agent has incentives to gather information but might also choose an option that does not fully match principal's needs while in the latter case the principal decides based on her own information only. The authors show that for principals with higher costs to gather information, it might be optimal to delegate decisions to a more informed agent. In the context of nancial decisions, this result works in favor of a substituability between information and delegation (asking the expert to take the right decision).
Another strand of the literature builds on the cheap-talk framework (Crawford and Sobel 1982) which refers to direct and costless communication to analyze the delegation process occuring between a biased expert and an uninformed decision maker. Ottaviani (2000) proposes a model in which principals dier in their degree of naivete and can choose between fully delegating their investment decision to a more informed agent or engaging in a cheap talk. Ottaviani shows that delegation gives higher expected payo to principals because then all the information is used as compared to cheap-talk in which the agent provides only part of the information to the principal. This result is generalized by Dessein (2002) who shows that least informed principals tend to delegate their decisions rather than interact with the agent suggesting some complementarity between information and the demand for professional advice. Hackethal et al. (2012) study the question of delegation from an empirical perspective using German data and show that richer and experienced investors with potentially higher nancial literacy tend to delegate more often to nancial advisors. The explanation they provide for this is related to the higher opportunity cost of time of richer investors. Overall, there tend to be a theoretical consensus about the fact that least informed investors prefer delegating their decision rather than asking for advice but empirical evidence as in Hackethal et al. (2012) tend to show that this might not be always the case.
In , the authors are interested in the determinants of nancial advice seeking and in the determinants of following the advice given by the expert. They build an analytical model in which they posit that better informed customers induce advisors to provide better advice. Hence, customers have an incentive to ask for advice even if their level of information is high enough to invest autonomously.
But the authors also show that nancially sophisticated customers are less likely to follow professional advice. This conclusion is supported by an empirical analysis of the SAVE-panel survey in Germany. Georgarakos and Inderst (2011) build on a cheap-talk model to look also at how levels of information interact with following professional advice. They highlight the importance of trust in advisor for less nancially sophisticated investors to follow or not the advice provided and show that well-informed investors tend to completely disregard advice.
Evidence of these results are found in the Eurobarometer data in which trust matters only for less nancially literate investors. These papers both show that in general nancially sophisticated investors tend not to follow the advice given by nancial experts.
In this paper, I am specically interested in the demand for professional nancial advice and its interaction with nancial literacy. Therefore, I leave apart the questions of delegation and of following or not the advice given. Regarding the demand for advice, the rationale is that less informed and nancially literate investors should have higher incentives to gather additional information from qualied sources when it comes to make nancial decisions. However, several papers show that nancially unsophisticated investors tend to turn more often to informal sources of information such as family, friends or acquaintances rather than professional experts when they seek nancial guidance (van Rooij et al. 2011; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a) . Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2011) using the SAVE-panel and Collins (2012) using the FINRA Financial Capability Survey report empricial evidence that the demand for nancial advice is associated with higher nancial literacy while Hung and Yoong (2010) show using experimental data from the RAND American Life Panel that nancial advice tend to be chosen by least nancially literate investors.
As opposed to the theoretical model of in which a complementarity is posited ex-ante between investor's nancial literacy and quality of advice, I let my simple communication model predict the pattern of the relationship. In this respect, the mechanic of my model is very similar to that in Calcagno and Monticone (2015) . We both consider a situation in which an uninformed customer (principal) can decide to ask for advice to a better informed nancial expert (agent) before investing. The communication game involved diers from the class of cheap-talk models because preferences of the principal and the agent are not always conicting. As in Calcagno and Monticone (2015) I nd that less nancially literate customers tend not to ask for advice because they know they will not receive a relevant information from advisors.
However, the stylized model I present in this paper is original in several respects. As opposed to Calcagno and Monticone (2015) I do not assume that the asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent comes from a dierential of knowledge regarding future nancial markets returns. I do not believe that professional advisors are more knowledgeable than customers regarding future returns as portfolios managed or advised by experts do not necessarily perform better than self-managed accounts (Hackethal et al. 2012; Karabulut 2013) .
Hence, my analysis does not restrict to the case of investing on nancial markets, rather I consider a situation that could apply to any nancial product. The source of uncertainty for the customer in my model is on her type or alternatively the characteristics of the nancial products. I assume that this uncertainty is decreasing with customer's level of nancial literacy. As in Bolton et al. (2007) and Ottaviani (2009, 2012a) , I assume that the customer does not perfectly observe her type and therefore cannot discriminate between any nancial products the one that best suits her needs. As argued in Bolton et al. (2007) , I assume that customers may be unaware of important tax or liquidity advantages of one of the products or they may not be aware of specic ne print contractual clauses.
The model also considers more complete beliefs for the customer. I assume that the customer has some beliefs regarding the alignment of her preferences with those of the advisor. In the baseline version of the model, this hypothesis does not play a signicant part as the believed probability that preferences are aligned is assumed to be small. Thereby, as in Calcagno and Monticone (2015) the baseline model predicts that less nancially literate customers do not ask for advice because they never get a relevant information from the advisor. In the appendix, I present an extended version of the model in which nancially unsophisticated customers may nd it protable to ask for advice even if they know the advice received will be biased towards advisor's preferences.
This happens when customers believe their preferences have a substantial probability to be aligned with those of the advisor so that the product advised corresponds to customer's type. In that case, the model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice. Customers with lower and higher levels of nancial literacy tend to ask for advice while customers with average levels of nancial literacy do not ask for advice.
In the empirical part of this paper, I test the conclusions of the model on a representative sample of the French population using the 2011 wave of the PATER survey. Financial literacy is measured with three questions on interest compounding, ination and risk diversication following Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a) . I nd a positive and signicant relationship between the level of nancial literacy and the probability to ask for advice which of course does not necessarily entails that all respondents who correctly answer to the nancial literacy questions ask for advice. To test for the non-monotonicity of the relationship between nancial literacy and the demand for advice suggested by the extended version of the model, I use a set of dummy variables for each number of questions correctly answered. The pattern of the relationship is found to be monotonic thereby supporting the complementarity hypothesis predicted by the baseline model.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the simple communication model and derive its equilibria. In section 3, I test the predictions of the model on the French PATER survey and provide robustness checks including instrumental variables regressions and alternative constructions of the index for nancial literacy. Finally, I conclude in section 4 and explore other promising ways of dealing with widespread nancial illiteracy.
Theoretical Background

Overview
The following stylized model considers a customer B which can invest her wealth in two dierent and mutually exclusive nancial products. I borrow from Bolton et al. (2007) and Ottaviani (2009, 2012a ) the fact that customer B (the principal) does not perfectly observe her type or alternatively does not perfectly observe the characteristics of each nancial product. Financial literacy is then understood here as a lack of information. I also borrow from Calcagno and Monticone (2015) the fact that customer B can ask for advice to a more informed advisor A (the agent) and engage in an information revelation game which diers from the class of cheap-talk games 2 .
Advisor A derives a dierent commission from each nancial product and so may have an incentive not 2 The model diers from cheap-talk games (Crawford and Sobel 1982) because preferences of the agent and the principal do not always conict.
to provide relevant information to the customer. But the advisor cares about reputation and then provides a biased advice only when the reputational cost of doing so does not exceed the benets. Customer B is assumed to have beliefs regarding which product best suits her needs and preferences alignment. As a consequence, the customer trades o asking for advice or deciding alone which product to buy based on her beliefs and awareness of the advisor's biasedness. I nd that the customer may not ask for advice when she knows the advisor will not provide a relevant information i.e. when the reputational costs are too low.
The next subsections present the characteristics of both the customer (she) and the advisor (he) and the last subsection reports the equilibria of the communication game.
2.2
The Customer I consider a rational customer B with preferences represented by a utility function u(.) with u (.) > 0 and u (.) < 0. This customer buys one unit of a nancial product θ ∈ Θ with card{Θ} = 2 from a nancial intermediary A. In other words, customer B has to choose between two nancial products the one θ B ∈ Θ that best suits her needs 3 such that for any θ ∈ Θ, 0 ≤ u(θ) ≤ u(θ B ). But B does not know which product is best suited for her needs. As in Bolton et al. (2007) and Ottaviani (2009, 2012a) , I assume that the customer might not be aware of certain tax and liquidity advantages or may not be aware of specic contractual clauses.
This is equivalent to assuming that the customer has incomplete information about her true type. She only observes a signal γ ∈ Θ telling her which nancial product is a best match. I assume the conditional probability that the message is true given the nancial product that best matches customer's needs P (γ = θ B /θ B ) to be an increasing function of customer's nancial sophistication:
with 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 2 being some measure of customer's level of nancial literacy.
For simplicity, I restrict the denition of nancial literacy to a lack of information regarding customer's true type. In the extreme case of a level of nancial literacy close to zero, the customer is unable to discriminate between any nancial product. The signal is not informative because the probability of each nancial product to be a best match is exactly the same:
. On the contrary if customer's nancial literacy is close to the upper bound, she perfectly knows which nancial product best suits her needs and p( 1 2 ) = 1.
I also assume that the customer can ask for advice to a commissioned nancial intermediary when deciding on which product to invest 4 . But the customer and the advisor may not favor the same product leading to a conict of interests. Customer B is assumed to have prior beliefs such that she believes preferences are aligned with probability α = P (θ A = θ B ) where θ A is the nancial product that provides the advisor with the highest commission.
3 Conversely, I assume that θ −B corresponds to the product that does not match customer's needs. 4 In this simple version of the game, I make the assumption that the customer systematically follows the advice given by the advisor.
2.3
The Advisor
The advisor earns a commission δ(θ) ≥ 0 when selling nancial product θ ∈ Θ. This commission diers from one product to the other such that there is a product θ A ∈ Θ which provides the advisor with the highest commission. Then for any θ ∈ Θ, it follows that 0 ≤ δ(θ) ≤ δ(θ A ). Let σ be the advice given by advisor A to customer B. At this point, the advisor has always an incentive to send σ = θ A to the customer even when
But in practice, the advisor cares about reputation and therefore about the matching between customer's needs and the nancial product, at least to some extent. This can be represented by a reputational cost that the advisor incurs whenever the product advised does not suit customer's needs (as in Bolton et al. 2007; Ottaviani 2009, 2012a; Calcagno and Monticone 2015) . I assume this reputational cost to be an increasing function of two arguments: customer's degree of knowledge of her true type p(ϕ) and a measure of mismatching between customer's needs and product advised which can be represented by the dierence between the highest possible utility and the actual utility: u(θ B ) − u(θ).
The reputational cost can then be written as the product of these two arguments:
The advisor always incurs a loss on misselling but this loss can be dramatically reduced when ϕ → 0 that is when the customer does not understand she has been swindled. Advisor's payo can nally be written as a prot-like function:
Assumption 1: In order to restrict the attention to cases in which a conict of interest can arise in the communication between the advisor and the customer I make the following assumption:
The rst condition implies that the advisor does not always have an incentive to swindle the customer when her level of nancial literacy is suciently high. The second condition implies that the advisor can have some incentives to provide misleading information when nancial literacy is too low.
2.4
Resolution of the Model
The timing of the model is as follows:
At t = 1: nature decides whether customer and advisor's preferences are aligned with some unobserved probability. Advisor A always knows whether preferences are aligned but customer B does not, she has beliefs regarding preferences alignment: α = P (θ A = θ B ).
At t = 2: customer B receives a private signal γ ∈ Θ telling her which product is a best match. This signal is true with some probability: p(ϕ) = ϕ + if θ A = θ B , preferences are aligned and the advisor has no incentive to advise the customer to buy a nancial product that would not suit her needs. In that case advisor A advises customer B to buy product θ B i.e. σ = θ B so as to get the highest possible payo: 
When θ A = θ B , the nancial literacy threshold below which σ = θ A and above which σ = θ B is then:
Customer's strategies
Customer B is assumed to perfectly observe the threshold ϕ * before deciding to consult or not the nancial advisor. The reliability of the information she gets from the advisor is linked to her level of nancial literacy.
Hence, customer's decision to ask for advice then depends on whether she stands above or below the threshold.
if ϕ ≥ ϕ * , customer B knows that she will get a relevant information from advisor A regardless to preferences alignment. In this case the customer has always an incentive to ask the advisor before investing.
She then gets the highest possible utility u(θ B ).
if ϕ < ϕ * , customer B knows that the advice she will get from the advisor depends on the alignment of preferences which she does not perfectly observe. Assuming α is small enough (α ≤ p(ϕ)), the customer is better o investing on her own rather than asking for advice 5 .
Equilibria
The extensive form of this simple communication game can be represented as follows. Customer B moves rst by deciding whether to ask or not for advice before investing. When investing alone, customer B relies only on her signal γ which is true with probability p(ϕ). She then gets u(θ B ) with probability p(ϕ) and u(θ −B ) with probability [1 − p(ϕ)]. Otherwise if the customer decides to ask for advice, the advisor gets the move and chooses whether to send a relevant information or to swindle the customer depending on his subsequent payo. The advisor then chooses σ = θ B either because θ A = θ B or ϕ ≥ ϕ * , he subsequently gets δ(θ B ) and the customer gets u(θ B ). While the advisor chooses σ = θ −B only when θ A = θ B and ϕ < ϕ * , he
and the customer gets u(θ −B ). 5 In the appendix, I relax the restriction on parameter α and report the predictions of the extended model. Empirical evidence from PATER (2011) however support the baseline specication with α ≤ p(ϕ).
Proposition 1:
In this game, a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies for advisor A and customer B so that no player has a protable deviation. Eventually the equilibria of the model depend on customer's level of nancial literacy if ϕ ≥ ϕ * : there is a unique fully revealing equilibrium in which advisor A advises θ B (σ = θ B ) and customer B asks for advice.
if ϕ < ϕ * : there is a unique pooling equilibrium in which advisor A advises product
and customer B does not ask for advice.
These equilibria suggest a complementarity between nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice. As in Calcagno and Monticone (2015) , the model predicts that nancial advisors have a regressive eect in the sense they increase the information of nancially literate customers and do not provide any relevant information to nancially unsophisticated customers. This phenomenon leads nancially literate customers to always ask for advice before investing in the model. Unsophisticated customers are predicted not to ask for advice but rather to invest on their own. In the following section, I use a survey of French households (PATER 2011) to test the validity of these conclusions.
3 Empirical analysis and weights were adjusted to preserve the representativity of the sample. Any member of the household could answer the questionnaire but more than 70% of respondents claimed to be in charge of the family nances.
Econometric sample
The full sample, which is representative of the French population is used to provide descriptive information on nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice. However, due to non-responses to some questions, the analysis is restricted to a smaller sample. The issue of non-responses typically arises when the question is computationally demanding or when the wording requires more concentration. Some questions on income or wealth are also less answered. In our case, this issue mainly concerns the dependent variable on the demand for nancial advice but also a question regarding self-condence on nancial issues. Excluding the observations with missing values leads to a subsample of 2,127 observations. Source: PATER 2011. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for each variable used in the analysis for the original and the econometric samples. Both samples do not dramatically dier except for the demand for nancial advice. Respondents in the econometric sample also tend to have slightly higher levels of nancial literacy and self-condence regarding nancial issues. Those respondents are more educated and less likely to be unemployed or retired, they are also wealthier and have higher income. Finally, respondents in the econometric sample tend to have had more often a positive previous experience with a nancial advisor and have been more often negatively impacted by the crisis. Those dierences are however small and I doubt they signicantly alter the conclusions I draw from the analytical part.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Financial literacy
The PATER survey encompasses a set of three questions on nancial literacy that have become standard in the literature to assess the understanding of fundamental concepts for nancial decision making. The set of questions on interest compounding, ination and risk diversication was rst designed by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a) according to four principles: simplicity, relevance, brevity and capacity to dierentiate. These questions have been included in many surveys across the world and have been shown to be related to several nancial behaviors ranging from stock market participation to nancial planning and indebtedness (see Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) In the original sample, nearly 48% of the respondents correctly answer the question on interest compounding and this share rises to 53% in the econometric sample. As mentioned, the PATER question on interest compounding diers from the benchmark question of Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b) because it requires a broad understanding of interest computation as well as an understanding of the dierence between simple and compound interest. This result can be compared to those of other countries such as Russia (Klapper et al. 2013) and Sweden (Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh 2011) which have surveys with approximately the same wording.
These countries have respectively 36% and 35% of respondents answering correctly the question on interest compounding. In other countries, a simpler wording was adopted for that question explaining part of the higher percentages of respondents answering correctly except for Italy: 65% in the United States (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011b) , 82% in Germany (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi 2011), 40% in Italy (Fornero and Monticone 2011) , and 85% in the Netherlands (van Rooij et al. 2011) . Therefore when trying to compare French results with other countries' it is hard to disentangle the eect of the wording from the pure eect of a nancial literacy dierential. Eventually, the fact that half of French respondents fail to give a correct answer to the interest compounding question even when a list of answers is provided, points the lack of basic nancial literacy in the French population.
Regarding the concept of ination, 61% of the original sample display an understanding of the impact of ination on purchasing power while more than 10% give an incorrect answer, and nearly a quarter does not know the answer or does not answer. As for the question on interest compounding, the percentage of correct answers is higher in the econometric sample with 68% of respondents answering correctly. These results put France in the international average with percentages of correct answers ranging from 59% in Sweden (Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh 2011) to 78% in Germany (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi 2011). Broadly speaking, households are more knowledgeable about ination when their country has experienced it. Conversely, countries which experienced deation have fewer respondents able to answer correctly the question on ination (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a) .
Respondents appear to have less diculty answering correctly the third question on risk diversication.
However, the wording and structure of this question dier enough from the benchmark to call for caution when making international comparisons. About two-thirds of the original sample gets the question on risk diversication right while this share is 73% in the econometric sample. Using PATER 2011, Arrondel et al. (2013) show that these agregate gures hide large dierences among population subgroups. Women, the youth and the elderly as well as the less educated tend to have a lower understanding of basic economic and nancial concepts. Thereby, these population are the most in need of relevant nancial advice when it comes to make nancial decisions. The next section reports statistics on the demand for nancial advice in France.
Sources of nancial information
Respondents in the PATER survey were also questioned about their sources of nancial information. Table 3 reports the results for both the original and the econometric samples. While respondents in the econometric sample tend to seek more often for nancial advice regardless to the source, the patterns in both samples are similar. Broadly speaking, households tend to rely more often on professional nancial advisors when it comes to gather nancial information. Nearly half of the original sample and three quarters of the respondents in the econometric sample rely on experts. The second most important source of nancial information is family followed by friends. Combining both sources, I nd that more than a third of the original sample and more than a half of the econometric sample ask for advice to family or friends. Media either mainstream or specialized are relied on by a quarter of the original sample and nearly fourty percent of the econometric sample. Overall, most households in both samples rely on one or several sources of nancial information when it comes to making nancial decisions. But nancial advisors capture a substantial share of the demand for nancial advice and remain the primary source of nancial information. Even among households which gather nancial information from a single source, nancial advisors remain the most relied on. Given the importance of professional advice, Table 3 shows how crucial it is to question the capacity of nancial advisors to provide relevant information to customers. But those agregate gures hide heterogenous patterns of the demand for nancial advice among population subgroups. Table 4 reports the shares of respondents consulting dierent sources of nancial information by sociodemographic characteristics. Broadly speaking, respondents aged 65 or above tend to rely less often on nancial advisors than the average respondent. This pattern is also true for other sources such as family or friends and the media. This holds even though the elderly could be the most in need of nancial advice regarding pension management and budgeting as well as inheritance and gifts. The fact that the share of respondents relying on family or friends for nancial advice decreases with age could come from some independence factor which would make individuals less willing to ask for advice to their family or friends when they age. Media either meainstream or specialized are more often relied on by middle-aged respondents. Regardless to the source of nancial information, women are found to ask less often for nancial advice. This pattern is all the more surprising given the fact that in PATER 2011 more than 58 percent of the respondents claiming to be in charge of the household's nances were women. This actually comes from a composition eect which is controled for in the analytical section. Education appears positively related to asking for nancial advice. The higher the level of education, the more often respondents ask either source for advice. Finally, employed and self-employed respondents ask for advice more often than unemployed and retired respondents. For the latter, this may come from the age eect discussed above. Overall, young working men with higher levels of education tend to ask more often for nancial advice from either source but in particular from nancial advisors. 
Financial literacy and the demand for professional nancial advice
Several papers have shown that populations are not equally equiped to face nancial decisions Mitchell 2007b,c, 2008; Lusardi et al. 2010) . In particular in France Arrondel et al. (2013) show using the PATER survey that women, young and old people as well as the less educated and the unemployed tend to have lower levels of nancial literacy which can have severe consequences on their ability to plan for the future. It is also the case that these populations are less likely to seek for nancial advice as described above despite the fact that they might be the most in need of nancial guidance. Given the importance of the demand addressed to nancial advisors, I concentrate my attention on this source of nancial information to analyze the extent to which nancial literacy can be related to the demand for nancial advice. Table 5 reports the shares of respondents by number of correct answers to nancial literacy questions for respondents consulting and not consulting a nancial advisor. In both the original and the econometric samples, the number of questions answered correctly increases when respondents do actually consult a nancial advisor. This positive correlation does not shed light on any potential causal relationship but it reects the composition of the population in terms of nancial literacy levels and demand for nancial advice. Individuals who actually lack nancial sophistication are also those who do not ask for advice. The theoretical part of this paper suggested a direction of the causality from nancial literacy to the demand for nancial advice: nancially sophisticated customers ask for advice because they know the advice they will get will be relevant while nancially illiterate customers do not ask for advice because they anticipate they will not receive any relevant information. In the following section, I attempt to conrm this relationship using the PATER survey and taking into account several determinants of the demand for nancial advice.
Regressions
Specication
So as to characterize the pattern of the relationship between the level of nancial literacy and the probability to ask for professional nancial advice I perform several econometric regressions. The baseline specication is the following:
The dependent variable y i is a dichotomic variable equal to one when respondent i consults a nancial advisor and zero otherwise. The right-hand side of the equation includes a variable on nancial literacy which corresponds to the number of nancial literacy questions correctly answered by the respondent. This variable takes values between 0 and 3. Two vectors of explanatory variables are also added to the equation. The rst one includes socioeconomic variables as gender, age, education, occupation, nancial wealth and income. The second vector adds variables that are more specically related to the nancial experience of the respondent. This vector includes a self-assessed measure of nancial culture which is considered to be a self-condence variable regarding nancial issues. It also includes a set of dummy variables indicating whether the respondent has ever had previously a positive experience with a nancial advisor, whether the respondent experienced a negative impact of the nancial crisis and whether the respondent holds risky assets. Eventually, an idiosyncratic error term is added to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The PATER survey does not allow to control for characteristics of the advisor. However while advisor's characteritics, in particular gender and education, may have an inuence on how much customers invest in risky assets (Direr and Visser 2013) , I do not believe that these characteristics play a central role in the decision to ask or not for advice. The reason for this can be that customers do not observe the characteristics of the advisor unless they actually ask for advice.
In the next sections, regressions are performed using a linear probability model rather than a probit model given the tractability of ordinary least squares regressions and the possibility for a direct interpretation of coecients. This choice does not alter the results nor does it the conclusions 6 . I perform several regressions starting by including only the index of nancial literacy and then including the other vectors so as to disentangle the eects of each set of variables. I then perform several robustness checks to control for the simultaneous decision to invest in risky assets and ask for advice but also instrumental variables (IV) regression to test the endogeneity of the nancial literacy index. Indeed I am interested in the potential impact of nancial literacy on the demand for nancial advice. But there might be a reverse causality arising from the fact that consulting a nancial advisor increases the level of nancial literacy through some learning eect. It might also be the case that both nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice are driven by a third variable that is omitted in the baseline specication. I therefore perform IV regressions with dierent sets of instruments to take into account any potential endogeneity bias. Finally, I report results of regressions using alternative specications of the nancial literacy index. Table 6 reports results of ordinary least squares regressions of a dummy for asking for advice to a nancial advisor on nancial literacy and other explanatory variables. The rst column includes only the index of nancial literacy. Following the pattern in Table 5 of the descriptive section, the coecient on nancial literacy appears to be positive and signicant at the 1% level. The second column adds the set of socioeconomic variables to the regression. In contrast with what is observed in the descriptive part, the demand for nancial advice appears to be negatively related to being a man. Some variables appear not to have any inuence on the demand for nancial advice such as age, education, and income. On the contrary the level of nancial wealth is 6 Following the results by Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) on linear probability models, I also provide estimations using probit models for robustness checks in the appendix. The results I obtain with linear probability models do not signicantly dier from those I obtain with probit estimations. The conclusion I draw from the estimations remain the same.
Results
positively and signicantly associated to asking for advice. The wealthier the respondent in terms of nancial assets, the higher the probability to rely on professional advice. This does not necessarily come from a higher opportunity cost of time of richer households as argued in Hackethal et al. (2012) given that I do not nd any signicant inuence of income. Rather, it might be that everything else equal richer households have access to a greater variety of nancial products which makes them more prone to ask for advice. Eventually, this second regression shows that respondents who do not work either because they retired or because they are unemployed tend to ask less often for advice though the coecient is weakly signicant.
In the third regression, the vector of variables on respondent's nancial experience is added. This set of variables is expected to have a more direct inuence on the demand for nancial advice. Indeed, respondents who had a positive previous experience with a nancial advisor as well as those who experienced a negative impact of the nancial crisis are more likely to consult a nancial advisor. Those facts increase in average the probability to ask for advice by respectively 11.2 and 4.2 percentage points. Self-condence regarding nancial issues is also positively and signicantly associated to the demand for advice. Investing on nancial markets by holding risky assets does not appear to have an inuence on the demand for advice. Eventually, the introduction of the nancial experience vector does not alter the signicance of the variables previously discussed. Answering correctly an extra question of nancial literacy increases the probability to ask for advice by 3.2 percentage points while being a man or not working decreases this probability by respectively 4.9 and 4.8 percentage points.
Financial wealth is still positively and signicantly associated to the demand for nancial advice. Respondents with a nancial portfolio worth more than 75k euros increase their probability to see a nancial advisor by 14.6 percentage points everything else equal. The last column reports the results of the regression including dummies for each number of nancial literacy questions answered correctly. I nd no signicant dierence between not answering any question correctly and answering only one question correctly. But answering correctly two or three questions tends to have a signicantly higher inuence on the demand for nancial advice as compared to not answering any question correctly. This supports the monotonicity of the relationship between nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice. Overall, these regressions show that there is a positive and highly signicant relationship between nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice even when taking into account other factors that could inuence the demand for advice. This supports a complementarity between the capacity of individuals to understand basic nancial concepts and their willingness to seek advice from qualied sources. As argued in the theoretical part, this phenomenon could stem from the unability of nancial advisors to disclose relevant information to less nancially sophisticated customers.
This argument is supported by empirical results found in other papers. Using data of individuals interacting with real professional advisors which are potentially biased, Bucher-Koenen and Koenen (2011), Collins (2012) and Calcagno and Monticone (2015) nd a positive relationship between nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice. Only investors with higher levels of nancial literacy ask for advice because they know they will receive a relevant information. On the contrary, Hung and Yoong (2010) show using experimental data from the RAND American Life Panel that when proposed a hypothetical consultation with an advisor, respondents with the lowest levels of nancial literacy tend to ask more often for advice than the average respondent.
The implementation of their experiment does not encompass any product-biased compensation scheme for the hypothetical advisor nor does it encompass any compensation. This could explain the reason for which in their case, nancial advice is primarily chosen by the less nancially literate investors who are the most in need of nancial guidance.
In the following section I test the robustness of these results by performing regressions with alternative indices of nancial literacy. I also use an instrumental variables approach to test for the endogeneity of nancial literacy and account for potential simultaneous demand for advice and nancial behaviors.
Robustness checks Endogeneity of nancial literacy
A problem of endogeneity can arise with the index of nancial literacy in the regressions. This endogeneity could come from a reverse causality bias driven by a learning eect from consulting a nancial advisor. It could also stem from an omitted variable which would inuence both the level of nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice. To take into account this potential bias and test for the actual endogeneity of nancial literacy in the regressions, I perform instrumental variables (IVs) regressions using the generalized method of moments (GMM). This method allows to take into account the heteroskedasticity of the error terms which stems from the linear probability model.
I use two sets of IVs to control for the endogeneity of nancial literacy. These variables are related to respondent's nancial literacy and unrelated to the demand for nancial advice. The rst set of IVs is made of a self-assessed measure of the level the respondent had in mathematics at school. Given the basic computational requirements needed to answer the nancial literacy questions, this variable has a fair chance to be strongly correlated with nancial literacy and unrelated to the demand for advice. The second IV used in this set is a dummy indicating whether respondent's parents held risky assets in their portfolios. This variable acts as a proxy for respondent's parents nancial literacy which should be well correlated with respondent's nancial literacy. The second set of IVs I use is also made of the variable on respondent's level in mathematics at school and a dummy indicating whether the respondent has no political opinion. This second variable is chosen as an IV given the results found in Arrondel et al. (2013) . Using the PATER survey, the authors show that while there is no signicant dierences in terms of nancial literacy between right-wing and left-wing aliates, respondents with no political opinion tend to have a lower level of nancial literacy than the average everything else equal.
While there is more research to be done in this eld to assert the source of the correlation, it is unlikely that having no political opinion inuences the probability to ask for advice. Table 7 : Two-step GMM estimation of the probability to ask for advice to a nancial advisor 1st
Step (1) GMM (1) 1st Step (2) GMM ( Good prev. exp. Table 7 reports the results of the two-step GMM estimations of the probability to ask for advice to a nancial advisor. The rst column reports the rst-step of the regression with the rst set of IVs. Financial literacy is found to be correlated with being a man, the level of education, wealth and income of the respondent. It appears that more nancially literate respondents are also those who experienced a negative impact of the crisis. This result may however come from a reporting bias. More nancially knowledgeable respondents may also be those who track the more often their nances and therefore those who are the more aware of the adverse eects the crisis had on their portfolios. More importantly, the IV on math level at school which is coded as a scale from 1 to 5 appears to be positively and signicantly associated to nancial literacy. Parents' stockholding appears to be positively correlated with nancial literacy and the coecient is signicant at the 1% level. The F statistic of this regression (F=24.04) supports a strong joint signicance of both IVs.
The second column reports the results of the second step of the rst GMM estimation. The instrumented variable of nancial literacy does not appear signicant anymore while the coecients of the other variables and their signicance do not dramatically dier from those in the baseline regression without instrumentation (Table 6 , OLS (3)). I perform two tests to challenge the quality of the instruments. The joint null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the instruments are valid i.e. uncorrelated with error terms. With a p-value of 0.285
and an F-statistic of 24.04 in the rst step I conclude that the instruments are relevant and valid. However, the endogeneity test with a p-value of 0.962 shows that the endogenous variable should actually be treated as exogenous. Thus, there does not seem to be an endogeneity bias in the baseline regression. The measure of nancial literacy I use relies on computational skills and other cognitive abilities which are hard to enhance at adulthood (Christelis et al. 2010 ). This could explain the exogeneity of nancial literacy at least regarding a potential reverse causality bias. Asking for advice and interacting with a nancial advisor is unlikely to enhance the level of nancial literacy of a customer.
The third and fourth columns report the rst and second steps of the GMM estimation using the set of IVs including a political opinion dummy. Having no political opinion is negatively associated to the level of nancial literacy as found in Arrondel et al. (2013) and the coecient is signicant at the 1% level. Both IVs in this regression appear to be relevant as they are signicantly associated to the level of nancial literacy with a strong joint signicance (F=32.53). The results of the second step do not dier from those of the rst GMM regression. The Sargan and endogeneity tests conrm that the instruments are valid but that the index of nancial literacy should be treated as exogenous.
Simultaneity issue of nancial behaviors and asking for advice
Identifying the relationship between the demand for nancial advice and the level of nancial literacy is challenging because I cannot exclude the fact that nancial literacy is related to nancial behaviors. These nancial behaviors can indeed be related to the demand for nancial advice. In other words, stockholders or nancial planners which exhibit higher levels of nancial literacy may actually be those who ask for advice either because they need information to make decisions or because the advice inuences their nancial decisions. Hence, not considering this point may lead to spurious correlation between nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice. In that case, the positive relationship I have identied in the previous sections between nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice would simply reect the fact that the individual is a stockholder or a nancial planner.
To account for this and identify the genuine relationship between nancial advice and nancial literacy I included a dummy variable in the baseline regressions (Table 6 ) indicating whether the respondent holds risky assets. This variable is not signicant suggesting that it does not inuence the demand for nancial advice.
But, stockholding might be an endogenous variable because of a reverse causality: nancial advice could foster stockholding. Therefore, I need to rely on an IV approach to take into account any endogeneity bias from nancial behaviors and conrm the results of the baseline model. Table 8 reports the results of a bivariate probit estimating simultaneously the demand for advice and the participation to the stock market. I use two instruments to control for the potential endogeneity of holding risky assets. These instruments are two dummies indicating whether the individual has positive expectations regarding future stock market returns and whether the individual is risk averse. Both instruments exhibit the expected sign and are highly signicant. Overall, controlling for the endogeneity of risky assets holding barely aects the coecients of the demand for advice equation. Financial literacy is still positive and highly signicant, thereby supporting the results of the baseline model. The correlation coecient of the error terms of both equations appears not signicant suggesting that risky assets holding is not endogenous. Source: PATER 2011. Dep. Var. Advice: =1 if consult n. advisor, =0 otherwise. Dep. Var. Risky assets: =1 if hold risky assets, =0 if no risky assets. Signicant at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
In table 9, I perform the same simultaneous regressions estimation this time considering nancial planning as a potential driver for the relationship between nancial literacy and the demand for advice. Arrondel et al. (2013) provide evidence that individuals who plan for the future tend to have higher levels of nancial literacy, it is therefore important to take into account the simultaneous decision to plan and ask for advice so as to ascertain the role of nancial literacy. In the nancial planning equation I add controls for expected returns on nancial assets and time preference. As in the previous case, the coecients of the demand for nancial advice are not aected by controlling for the simultanous decision to plan for the future. However, the correlation coecient of the error terms of both equations appears signicantly dierent from zero. This result simply uncovers the fact that nancial planners are more prone to ask for advice but eventually this does not alter the conclusions I draw from the baseline model. Financial literacy appears to be related to the demand for nancial advice even when taking into account nancial behaviors that could inuence the demand for advice. 
Alternative indices of nancial literacy
The last robustness check I perform consists in replacing the baseline index of nancial literacy (number of questions correctly answered) by a dummy variable equal to one when the questions are all correctly answered and a set of dummies for each question correctly answered. The rst column of Table 10 reports the results of the regression with the dummy for all questions correctly answered. The coecient on nancial literacy is still positive and signicant at the 5% level. Hence, answering correctly all the three questions of nancial literacy increases the probability to see a nancial advisor by 3.4 percentage points. The second estimation in Table 10 provides information on the inuence of each question answered correctly on the probability to ask for advice.
While the question on interest compounding does not play a signicant part, the understanding of ination and more importantly of risk diversication inuences signicantly the probability to ask for advice. In both these regressions, the other coecients are not altered as compared to the baseline estimation. The results I nd by performing GMM regressions, bivariate probit and replacing nancial literacy by alternative indices provide support to the baseline specication and results (Table 6 , OLS (3)). Financial literacy is positively related to the demand for nancial advice. Theoretically, the model suggests that the direction of the relationship goes from nancial literacy to the demand for nancial advice given the unability of nancial advisors to provide relevant advice to the less nancially literate customers. While it is empirically dicult to assert this causality, the results of the IV regressions support this direction of the causality. This has important consequences because nancial advisors do not provide relevant information to those who are the most in need of guidance and tend to widen the informational gap between nancially sophisticated and unsophisticated customers. Hence, given product-biased compensation schemes, nancial advice cannot provide a relevant substitute to nancial literacy when it comes to making nancial decisions.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between the level of nancial literacy of a customer of nancial products and her probability to interact with a nancial advisor. This issue is important as several studies showed that low levels of nancial literacy are associated with portfolio underdiversication, poor nancial planning and overindebtedness. In this context, I question the communication process occuring between an informed nancial advisor and an uninformed customer with a simple theoretical model. The baseline model predicts that only nancially sophisticated customers receive relevant information from advisors and that this fact prevents less nancially literate customers from asking advice.
Using the 2011 wave of the PATER survey I test this conclusion of the model and nd that the higher the level of nancial literacy of a customer, the higher her probability to ask for professional advice. The relationship I nd is monotonic but only weakly. In light of the model, this suggests that nancial literacy and the demand for nancial advice are complements rather than substitutes which stems from the compensation structure of nancial advisor.
These compensation schemes tend to prevent nancial advisors from providing relevant information to customers who are the most in need of nancial guidance. As in Calcagno and Monticone (2015) I nd that advisors have a regressive eect in the sense they increase the level of information of nancially sophisticated customers and decrease that of less nancially literate customers. These results therefore call for other promising ways to deal with widespread low levels of nancial literacy and help households increase their nancial wellbeing. While reforming nancial advisors' compensation schemes could be an interesting way such that advisors would be directly paid by customers in a lump sum manner, it is not sure whether customers of nancial services are willing to pay directly for nancial advice (Inderst and Ottaviani 2012b) .
Other levers include just-in-time education, rules of thumb or simplication of nancial products but nancial education programs have lately become the mostly used and debated manner to deal with the consequences of low nancial literacy. These programs are intended to increase customers' level of nancial literacy by giving them the tools to deal with basic nancial decisions and cope with adverse nancial shocks. The eectiveness of such nancial education programs regarding nancial outcomes is still debated (Miller et al. 2014) . However, the simple model I propose shows that nancial literacy is not only important for nancial decision making but also for being able to receive relevant advice. Financial advisors in the theoretical model are found to provide relevant advice only to nancially sophisticated customers. In that sense, even if nancial education programs may not directly alter customer's nancial decisions, these programs are still paramount to allow customers to understand their nancial needs and empower them when facing biased nancial advisors.
Appendix Proofs of Proposition 1
In what follows I prove the existence and uniqueness of both equilibria of the communication game. I rst rely on Nash's existence theorem (Nash 1951) which states that every nite game has a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium to show that there does not exist any other equilibrium than the candidate equilibirum. I then consider every outcome of the game to show that these outcomes are not stable and that deviations lead to the candidate equilibrium.
ϕ ≥ ϕ * : in this candidate Nash equilibrium advisor A advises σ * = θ B and customer B asks for advice.
Payos are π * = δ(θ B ) and u * = u(θ B ).
Existence
Let us consider a deviation from the advisor with σ = θ −B , this deviation is not protable because advisor's payo would be π
where advisor A advises σ = θ B with probability λ > 0 and σ = θ −B with probability (1 − λ). Then advisor's payo would be 
In mixed strategy, if customer B asks for advice with probability µ > 0 and invests on her own with probability (1 − µ),
.u(θ −B )} < u * . In both cases, the deviation is not protable for customer B.
Uniqueness
Let us consider the pooling strategy where σ = θ B whenever θ A = θ B , and σ = θ −B whenever θ A = θ B , or
In that case, the advisor gets a higher payo by advising σ = θ B regardless to the alignment of preferences because he gets π dev = δ(θ B ) ≥ π * .
Let us now consider the partially revealing strategy where σ = θ B with probability λ > 0 and σ = θ −B with
the advisor has an incentive to deviate and advise σ = θ B which gives him a higher payo π dev = δ(θ B ) > π * .
Consider now customer's strategy not to ask for advice. In that case, she gets u
but she would be better o by asking for advice and getting u dev = u(θ B ) > u * . The same conclusion holds if we consider mixed strategies in which the customer asks for advice with probability µ > 0. Customer B gets
.u(θ −B )} and therefore has an incentive to deviate and ask for advice to get u dev = u(θ B ) > u * .
ϕ < ϕ * : in this candidate Nash equilibrium advisor A advises σ * = θ A and customer B does not asks for advice. Payos are π * = 0 and u
Existence
Let us consider a deviation from the customer who decides to ask for advice. Then the advisor chooses σ = θ A and the payo of the customer depends on the alignment of preferences. Given customer's beliefs α = P (θ A = θ B ) and assumption α ≤ p(ϕ), customer's expected payo when asking for advice is u dev = α.u(θ B ) + (1 − α).u(θ −B ) < u * which makes the deviation not protable. Now let us assume a mixed strategy in which customer B asks for advice with probability µ > 0 and invests on her own with probability (1 − µ). Then her payo would be
Hence a deviation in mixed strategy is not protable for the customer. Now let us consider a deviation from advisor A with σ = θ B regardless to the alignment of preferences. In that case, the advisor gets π dev = 0 because the customer still does not ask for advice. This comes from the fact that if customer B asks for
A would have an incentive to deviate if he could commit to sending σ = θ B because then he would get a positive payo. But given that he cannot commit, the deviation would not be protable. Let us now consider a deviation in mixed strategy in which advisor A advises σ = θ A with probability λ > 0 and σ = θ B with probability (1 − λ). In that case also, the advisor would get π dev = 0 because the customer does not ask for advice. Assuming customer B asks for advice, advisor A would get π dev = δ(θ B ) whenever θ A = θ B and
These outcomes are higher than what the advisor gets at the equilibrium. However, as already said the advisor cannot commit to σ = θ B to make the customer ask for advice because δ(
Hence, the deviation is not protable for the advisor.
Uniqueness
Let us consider the strategy in which the customer asks for advice. In that case, customer B gets u * = α.u(θ B ) + (1 − α).u(θ −B ). The customer would get a higher payo by investing on her own,
The same conclusion holds if we consider mixed strategies in which the customer asks for advice with probability µ > 0.
.u(θ −B )} and therefore has an incentive to deviate and invest on her own
Regarding the advisor, let us consider the strategy in which σ = θ B , in that case the advisor gets π * = 0. If the customer asked for advice, the advisor would get
Hence, the advisor would have an incentive to deviate and play the dominant strategy σ = θ A . The same result is found when considering the mixed strategy in which advisor A advises σ = θ A with probability λ > 0 and σ = θ B with probability (1 − λ). In that case, advisor's payo is π * = 0 when customer B does not ask for advice. If customer B asks for advice, π * = δ(θ B ) whenever θ A = θ B and π
Hence, advisor A has an incentive to deviate and play the dominant strategy σ = θ A . Indeed, when customer B asks for advice, the
Extension of the model
In the baseline version of the model I assumed α ≤ p(ϕ) to avoid multiple equilibria whenever ϕ < ϕ * . In what follows, I relax this assumption to see how this inuences the predictions of the model. The parameter α is dened as customer's belief regarding preferences alignment such that α = P (θ A = θ B ). Alternatively, α can be considered as a measure of customer's trust in advisor's capacity to disclose relevant information. Now, I
assume no restriction on the values α can take. This does not modify the equilibrium when ϕ ≥ ϕ * , the model still predicts a fully revealing equilibrium in which customer B asks for advice and advisor A advises σ = θ B .
However when ϕ < ϕ * , the customer knows that the advice she will get from the advisor depends on the alignment of preferences which she does not perfectly observe. The situation customer B faces in this case can be represented in the following graph:
Figure 2: Customer's decision tree without restriction on α
Customer B compares her expected utilities in the case she invests alone and in the case she asks for advice.
When ϕ < ϕ * customer B asks for advice only if:
Hence there exists a second cuto for nancial literacy below which the customer will benet from consulting the advisor even if preferences may not be aligned:
When the belief α that preferences are aligned is higher than the probability p(ϕ) that message γ is true, the customer is better o asking for advice even if ϕ < ϕ * . In that case, the expected utility of investing based on advisor's recommendation is higher than the expected utility of investing based on customer's information only. In the econometric section of this paper, I report a regression (Table 6 , OLS (4)) which aims at testing whether less nancially literate customers have also an incentive to ask for advice. To test this hypothesis and capture the potential heterogenous inuence of nancial literacy on the demand for advice, I replace the index of nancial literacy by a set of dummy variables for each number of questions correctly answered. This allows to capture the dierential eects of dierent levels of nancial literacy on the demand for advice. I nd no signicant dierence between not answering any question correctly and answering only one question correctly.
However, answering correctly two or three questions tends to have a signicantly higher inuence on the demand for nancial advice as compared to not answering any question correctly. This provides support to a weakly monotonic relationship between nancial literacy and the demand for advice in contrast with the predictions of the extended version of the model. Nevertheless this result could still be compatible with the theoretical model. It could simply suggest that the second cut-o for nancial literacy ϕ * * is low enough (α ≤ p(ϕ)) such that none of the less nancially literate customers have an incentive to ask for advice. This happens when less nancially sophisticated customers believe their preferences dier enough from those of the advisor such that the advisor always advises a product that does not suit customer's needs whenever ϕ < ϕ * . Source: PATER 2011. Probit of estimations in Table 6 . Dep. Var.: =1 if consult n. advisor, =0 otherwise. Signicant at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Table 12 : Bivariate probit estimation of the probability to ask for advice to a nancial advisor 1st
Probit estimations
Step (1) Probit (1) 1st Step (2) Probit (2) FL (N correct) Source: PATER 2011. Bivariate probit of estimations in Table 7 . Endogenous Var.: FL (N correct). Dep. Var. GMM: =1 if consult n. advisor, =0 otherwise. Signicant at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Source: PATER 2011. Probit of estimations in Table 10 . Dep. Var.: =1 if consult n. advisor, =0 otherwise. Signicant at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
